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Abstract: Having peaked in early 2007 Irish house prices have fallen steadily. Negative equity
occurs if house price falls result in the house value being lower than the outstanding debt. Many
in negative equity will be unaffected and will continue to pay their mortgage without difficulty.
Negative equity can increase the probability of defaulting if it occurs at the same time as cash-
flow problems, possibly caused by illness or job loss. This paper estimates that 116,000 borrowers
were in negative equity at the end of 2009, rising to 196,000 borrowers by end-2010. Borrowing
at, or close to the price peak, high loan-to-value ratios, interest only mortgages and longer
mortgage terms have contributed to higher numbers in negative equity. First-time buyers are
more likely to be experiencing negative equity. The research shows that many of those who have
mortgages are employed in sectors where employment prospects, to date, remain relatively robust.
Policies that assist households overcome a loss in income may help lower the default rate. 
I INTRODUCTION
A
consequence of recent house price falls is that some households will find
themselves in the situation where they owe more than their houses are
worth. In other words they are in negative equity. Having peaked in early 2007
house prices in Ireland have fallen steadily. By October 2009 house prices were
down nearly 27 per cent from their peak in early 2007 according to the
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equity vary from 170,000 mortgage holders in October 2008 to 150,000
mortgage borrowers in August 2009.1 A mortgage borrower is in negative
equity if a drop in house prices results in the value of the house being lower
than the outstanding debt. The level of debt remaining depends on the initial
price paid, the initial loan and any equity, giving the loan-to-value ratio, as
well as any reduction in the capital balance outstanding as a result of
mortgage repayments. Some borrowers will also benefit from equity
accumulated from any house price increases that occurred after they
purchased their house.
The second part of this article provides an overview of why negative equity
matters for the wider economy as well as examining the relationship between
negative equity and mortgage default. Section III briefly outlines some of the
features of the Irish housing boom. Section IV estimates the number in
negative equity in Ireland, primarily based on published data from the
Department of the Environment. Estimates as to the numbers in negative
equity are sensitive to the underlying assumptions. In the fifth section we
explore the impact of a number of alternative assumptions. Following this,
using unpublished data from the EU Survey of Income and Living Conditions,
the sixth section attempts to provide some indication of those employment
sectors where individuals are vulnerable to the impact of negative equity. In
Section VII some policies to overcome the problem are examined and finally
Section VIII concludes.
II  WHY IS NEGATIVE EQUITY IMPORTANT?
In many cases negative equity will not be an issue. Many of those in
negative equity will be unaffected and will continue to pay their mortgage
without difficulty. Negative equity will only become an issue for a household if
they need to sell their house and cannot wait for the housing market to
improve. In an analysis of housing market cycles the OECD (2005) show that
the average maximum duration for a real house price downturn is just over 6
years. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) examine the international experience of
house price declines and find that, historically, real house price declines have
averaged 35.5 per cent and last on average 6 years. However, the presence of
negative equity can have important implications for households and for the
wider economy. 
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As the incidence of negative equity increases with falling house prices,
negative equity can have the effect of adding to a household’s financial
difficulties, as well as having a range of implications for the overall economy. 
Given the impact of negative equity on the household many of its wider
effects on the economy feed through the channel of the consumer. Households
in negative equity may consume less as they feel less wealthy but also feel that
they no longer have access to funds via housing equity. Disney, Gathergood
and Henley (2009) in an analysis of housing capital gains and losses find
changing house prices have an asymmetric effect of savings, with a loss in
housing wealth (negative equity) associated with higher savings. House price
shocks also have a negative impact on consumption. However, they find that
house price increases that take the household out of negative equity can lead
to a large consumption response as households lower any precautionary
saving that had been accumulated.
Negative equity is likely to dampen mobility as the housing market
recovers. Being in negative equity may prevent a potential seller from
lowering their asking prices sufficiently to attract buyers. Those in negative
equity are likely to wait until house prices recover sufficiently to repay their
outstanding mortgage. Any recovery in transaction levels is therefore likely to
lag recovery in prices. Henley (1998) using the British Household Panel
Survey finds negative equity has a serious impact on residential mobility. He
estimates that of those in Britain in negative equity in the early 1990s, twice
as many would have moved if they had not been in negative equity. 
Using US data Ferreira et al. (2008), show that negative equity can affect
the labour market with workers “locked in” to a location as they are reluctant
to sell and realise a loss. Gyourka and Siaz (2003), find that owners with
negative equity behave more like renters and re-invest less in their properties.
Negative equity can also have implications for the financial system and the
availability of credit. The reduction in the value of mortgage based assets can
have an adverse effect on lending due to the impact on bank balance sheets.
This can lead to a contraction in the availability of credit to both households
and firms as banks make provisions for an anticipated increase in expected
losses.2
Negative Equity and the Probability of Default
Negative equity is commonly associated with mortgage default, with
concerns that the large increase in the numbers in negative equity will result
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if the borrower is already struggling with mortgage repayments then the
presence of negative equity can reduce the ability to make repayments. This is
because in the face of a temporary income shock a borrower could normally
withdraw equity from the home or take out a loan to make repayments using
housing equity as collateral. Negative equity can reduce the borrower’s
willingness to make repayments as default is considered preferable to
continuing to struggle to make repayments. 
However, by itself negative equity does not cause problems repaying a
mortgage. Although negative equity is a condition of default and can increase
the probability of defaulting, in itself negative equity does not necessarily
result in an increase in default. Foote, Gerardi and Willen (2008) show that
negative equity does not automatically lead to default. They found that of
borrowers likely to be in negative equity in Massachusetts in the early 1990s
less than 10 per cent eventually defaulted and based on their model predict for
2008-2010 that between 6-8 per cent of negative equity borrowers will default.
Whether or not default occurs depends on a number of factors. Borrowers may
still be able to afford the monthly repayments and may expect the loan balance
to move below the value of the house at some time in the future. The negative
impact on the borrower’s credit rating and accompanying difficulty accessing
borrowing in the future may make it worthwhile to continue to service the
mortgage rather than default. The probability of default increases if negative
equity occurs at the same time as a cash-flow problem, possibly caused by
illness, divorce or job loss, as the presence of negative equity can reduce the
ability to make repayments. 
However, work by Wilson (2007) shows that falling property prices can be
associated with falling mortgage delinquency rates, as occurred in Hong Kong
between 1998 and 2003. In this case, Wilson finds that owners had “…
sufficient liquidity to forestall default even though many had negative equity”.
In the case of Hong Kong the fall in interest rates that happened at the same
time as the fall in property prices is seen as an important contribution to low
mortgage delinquency rates. Thus, the experience internationally indicates
that it is the interaction between the macroeconomic environment and
negative equity that contributes to the ultimate default rate.
III  THE HOUSING MARKET BOOM
The Irish economy has grown strongly in recent years. Over the period
1995 to 2007 it is estimated that real GDP more than doubled. At the same
time income also grew. An important factor has been the increase in
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million in 2007.  
Accompanying the economic boom over the period 1997 to 2007 the Irish
housing market grew significantly. This growth, apart from a short
interruption in 2001, is reflected not only in house prices but also in other
indicators which show a huge expansion of activity levels within the market.
The permanent tsb/ESRI House Price Index shows that the housing market
peaked in early 2007, having experienced a boom since the mid-1990s. The
rapid growth in the housing market was driven by strong economic growth,
accompanied by employment growth and increases in disposable income.
Demographic trends also contributed to housing demand, with strong
population growth, particularly in the main household formation age groups,
a fall in average household size and a large net inflow of returning emigrants
and immigrants, (see OECD, 2006). Despite rapid price growth the demand for
dwellings remained high. Although houses have been highly priced to
purchase, homeowners benefited due to low interest rates and high capital
gains.
Entry to EMU brought about lower interest rates and competition in the
mortgage market also brought about discounted interest rates to attract
customers. These factors, by lowering the cost of borrowing for mortgage
purposes encouraged homeownership and contributed to a large increase in
the number of mortgage loans approved and paid. Department of the
Environment, Heritage and Local Government (DoEHLG) statistics show that
the number of mortgage loans paid in a single year rose to over 111,000 in
2006, compared to a level of around 57,000 in 1996. Between 2000 and 2008
over 760,700 mortgages were issued. Accompanying this was a large increase
in the level of residential mortgage debt outstanding, from close to €14 billion
in December 1996 to nearly €148 billion in December 2008.3 The housing
market boom also saw financial product development which encouraged or
facilitated homeownership. Doyle (2009) shows that the number of Irish
mortgage products increased substantially over the course of the boom, from
181 in 1997 to 254 in 2009. Tracker mortgages were introduced.4 According to
Kelly (2009) tracker rate mortgages account for an estimated 60 per cent of the
outstanding variable rate mortgage stock.
Mortgage products with terms longer than the traditional 20 years were
introduced. Loan-to-value ratios (LTVs)began to increase and borrowers were
able to access 100 per cent mortgages compared to the previous maximum of
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features in the development of the mortgage market in recent years by Doyle
(2009). Lending criteria moved from income multiples to a limit based on the
ratio of mortgage service cost to income. Addison-Smyth, McQuinn and
O’Reilly (2009), model the availability of mortgage credit and find evidence of
excess credit in the Irish market, especially since 2004, contributing to the rise
in house prices.
Interest only mortgages were also introduced. Finally, lenders began to
target the subprime mortgage sector. Ellis (2008a) attributes some of the
blame for the housing market meltdown in the United States and the rise in
the number of borrowers in negative equity to the easing of lending standards
that occurred there. 
Figure 1: Irish House Prices, by Buyer, December Each Year*
*Index based on nominal prices.
Source: permanent tsb/ESRI House Price Index.
IV  ESTIMATING THE NUMBER IN NEGATIVE EQUITY
The relationship between the original amount borrowed and the house
purchase price, the loan-to-value ratio (LTV), has an important role in
determining the extent to which a borrower will find themselves in negative
equity. A high LTV, for example a 100 per cent mortgage, leaves a borrower
with little or no “buffer” if house prices start to fall soon after they buy a house.
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provides a breakdown on the range of loan-to-values (LTVs) for repeat and
first-time buyers. The data suggests that there has been a move towards high
loan-to-value ratios in recent years and that repeat buyers in general have a
lower LTV than first-time buyers. Higher loan-to-value ratios mean that
recent borrowers, particularly first-time buyers, are more exposed to the risk
of negative equity. Over the period covered by the data, 2004-2008, the
majority of repeat buyers, between 45 and 50 per cent, have an LTV of less
than 70 per cent. The data does also show that there has been an increase in
the proportion of repeat borrowers with high loan-to-value ratios. In 2008, 22
per cent of repeat buyers had an LTV of 91 per cent and over, compared with
14 per cent in 2004.6 What is most noticeable is the high proportion of first-
time buyers (FTB) with a very high loan-to-value ratio. In 2007 and 2008
around one in four first-time buyers had a loan-to-value ratio of 100 per cent.
In contrast to repeat buyers less than 20 per cent of first-time buyers have an
LTV of 70 per cent or below. The increase in LTVs has been followed by a sharp
fall in house prices.
Table 1: Range of Loan-to-Value Ratios, by Buyer Type
Loan-to-Value
⇐ 70% 71-80% 81-90% 91-95% 96-99% 100%
Percentage of Mortgages Drawndown, by Year of Drawdown
First-Time Buyer
2004 17 8 23 46 1 6
2005 16 7 15 47 2 13
2006 16 6 12 27 5 34
2007 19 7 12 28 9 26
2008 18 7 13 31 8 23
Repeat Buyer*
2004 45 18 24 9 1 4
2005 43 17 24 11 1 5
2006 44 18 23 9 1 6
2007 50 15 20 9 1 5
2008 47 15 17 14 1 7
*Also includes residential investors.
Source: DoEHLG, Housing Statistics.
The Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government also
provide data on the range of mortgage terms, which shows that there has been
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depending on the buyer type. The majority of repeat buyers, 56 per cent in
2008, have a mortgage term of 25 years or less. In sharp contrast, 82 per cent
of FTBs have a mortgage term longer than 25 years and 54 per cent, the
majority, have a mortgage term of between 31 and 35 years in 2008.
Table 2: Range of Loan Terms, by Buyer Type
Years
⇐ 20 21-25 26-30 31-35 36+
Percentage of Loans, by Year of Drawdown
First-Time Buyer
2004 12 23 43 22 1
2005 8 15 33 41 3
2006 6 11 24 56 4
2007 6 10 19 62 3
2008 7 11 17 54 11
Repeat Buyer*
2004 41 34 20 5 1
2005 35 33 21 10 1
2006 32 33 20 14 1
2007 31 30 20 18 2
2008 31 25 18 18 7
*Also includes residential investors.
Source: DoEHLG, Housing Statistics.
Although alternative house price measures differ on price levels and the
pace of change there is general consensus that prices peaked in 2007. In order
to estimate the number of borrowers who might be facing negative equity the
following assumptions are made:
(1) House prices are the December house price for each year from permanent
tsb. The prices used are for Repeat Buyer and First-Time Buyer. Based 
on these prices by December 2008 house prices were approximately 15 
per cent below their peak, see Figure 1. Forecasts for 2009 and 2010 
are guided by the Quarterly Economic Commentary, Summer 2009, in
which new house prices were forecast to fall by 14 per cent in 2009 and
2010.
(2) A mortgage term of 25 years is assumed for repeat buyers. Based on Table
2 this is probably reasonable for former owner-occupiers. However, the
table also shows that in general FTBs have a longer mortgage term and so
a term of 35 years is assumed for FTBs. 
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databank for December each year. The interest rate in year of drawdown
is applied for the mortgage term.7 For 2009 and 2010 the interest rate is
based on the forecast in the Summer 2009 Quarterly Economic
Commentary at 3 per cent for both years.
(4) Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government
statistics show that for the period 2004-2008 first-time buyers accounted
for just over a third of mortgages. This is applied to the total number of
loans to allocate between repeat and first-time buyers in 2009 and 2010.
(5) The range for loan-to-values in 2009 and 2010 is assumed to be an average
of previous years (2004-2008). The loan-to-value ratio is based on the year
of drawdown and does not take account of the impact of any refinancing.
Those who refinanced close to the peak in house prices would not have had
a long period to make repayment prior to house prices falling.
(6) Borrowers are assumed to commence paying back their mortgage
immediately. The mortgage is assumed to be repaid in full by the end of
the term. In the initial years a higher proportion of the repayment goes
towards repaying interest rather than reducing the capital.
(7) Data is not yet available for full-year loan volumes in 2009. However,
statistics for the first half of the year show that loan volumes were 57 per
cent lower than in the same period in 2008. To provide loan volume
estimates for 2009 we multiply the 2008 total by 0.5, and repeat this for
2010. The average LTV range for 2004-08 is applied to our estimated loan
volume. 
It should be noted that the repeat buyer data includes residential
investors as these are not differentiated from other buyers in the published
data. Statistics from the Irish Banking Federation show that residential
investment letting mortgages accounted for 12.8 per cent of mortgage lending
in 2005 and rose to 18.9 per cent in 2008. Unfortunately, the data is not
available for earlier years, pre-boom. However, it does show that “other”
mortgages, remortgages and top-ups, currently account for 45-50 per cent of
mortgages. The response of those who own “buy to let” properties to negative
equity may differ from homeowners as they may view their options purely
from an investment perspective.
Using these assumptions we calculate the annual mortgage repayments.
As stated above it is also assumed that repayment of the mortgage debt starts
immediately.  The amount of principal paid off is equal to the repayment less
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fact that in the earlier years of the mortgage term a higher proportion goes
towards interest repayment rather than principal reduction. The outstanding
balance is compared to the house price in each year. If the mortgage balance
is greater than the house price then the borrower is considered to be in
negative equity8. 
The fall in house prices in 2007 resulted in a small number of borrowers
in negative equity at the end of the year, 19,525. These are mostly FTBs with
high loan-to-value ratios. House price falls in 2008, following declines in 2007,
means the number of mortgage borrowers with mortgage debt levels higher
than their house price at end-2008 is estimated at over 57,000. 
House prices have continued to fall in 2009. It is assumed that the decline
is in line with those forecast in the Summer 2009 Quarterly Economic
Commentary. If these forecasts prove to be correct then by end-2009 house
prices will be around 30 per cent lower than peak in nominal terms. Allowing
for the repayment of mortgage debt since drawdown the fall in house prices by
end-2009 means that the number of mortgage borrowers with mortgage debt
levels higher than the price of their house increases to over 116,000, up by
58,000 compared with the end-2008 figure. This represents a doubling of 
those in negative equity. Those in negative equity now include some who
borrowed with a high LTV as far back as 2004. Of those estimated to be in
negative equity at the end of 2009, 76.8 per cent are FTBs. This is supported
by Table 1 which shows that FTBs are more likely to have a higher loan-to-
value ratio.
If, as anticipated, house prices continue to fall in 2010 and using similar
assumptions to those outlined above, by the end of 2010, the number of
mortgage borrowers in negative equity could rise to over 196,000. Figure 2
shows that borrowers who drew their mortgage down between 2005 and 2007
are most likely to be in negative equity, as are FTBs.
Based on Census 2006,9 approximately 40 per cent of Irish households are
repaying a mortgage or purchasing from a local authority. The most recent
Medium-Term Review estimates that the number of households in Ireland in
2008 was over 1.5 million. Applying the ratio from Census 2006 implies over
645,000 households have mortgage debt. Assuming that borrowers in the
Department of the Environment data correspond to households then 18 per
cent of households who have a mortgage will be in negative equity at end-
2009, nearly one in five. By end-2010, 29.6 per cent of households with a
mortgage, nearly 1 in 3, will be in negative equity. In the case of FTBs, the
number in negative equity would rise to over 125,000 by end-2010.
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How does the situation in Ireland compare internationally? Estimates
produced for the UK suggest that between 7 and 11 per cent of UK owner-
occupier mortgage holders were in negative equity in the Spring of 2009,
depending on the data source used (Hellebrandt, Kawar and Waldron, 2009).
Alternative estimates for the UK by Tatch (2009), put the proportion at the
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(By Year of Loan Drawdown)
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between Q2 2005 and end-2008. Ellis (2008b) quotes numbers for the United
States which estimate that over 10 per cent of the US single-family housing
stock were already in negative equity in early 2008.
Table 3: Summary Table, Total
Estimated Estimated Estimated Negative Negative
Mortgage  Number of Number of  Equity Equity
Loans in  Households Households Loans as Loans as
Negative with  Mortgage  Percentage Percentage
Equity Debt of Total of Households 
Number of with Mortgage 
Households Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4)=(1)/(2) (5)=(1)/(3)
%%
End-2008 57,389 1,554,648 631,187 3.7 9.1
End-2009 116,083 1,591,983 646,345 7.3 18.0
End-2010 196,015 1,629,195 661,453 12.0 29.6
The numbers may not fully capture the numbers in negative equity given
the extent to which top-up mortgages and refinancing took place. The Irish
Banking Federation show that around the peak in house prices in 2007 top-up
mortgages accounted for approximately 30 per cent of loan draw downs, with
re-mortgages accounting for a further 16 per cent. The latter stages of the
boom in house prices saw increasing awareness of and demand for interest
only mortgages. Given that no capital would be repaid for the portion of the
term that is interest only this would increase the number of borrowers in
negative equity. Figure 4 shows that the proportion of interest only loans had
risen in recent years and accounted for approximately 15 per cent of loans
approved. Ellis (2008b) shows that mortgages that do not amortise in their
early years are more prone to moving into negative equity.
Based on the data it is also possible to calculate the value by which
borrowers are in negative equity at the end of 2010. For 23 per cent, negative
equity accounts for less than 5 per cent of the estimated house price.
Approximately another 17 per cent have negative equity of between 5 and 10
per cent, while 30 per cent have negative equity between 10 and 20 per cent of
the estimated house price. Nearly 29 per cent have negative equity over 20 per
cent of the value of the house. It is noticeable that the majority of those with
negative equity less than 10 per cent are repeat buyers, whereas the majority
over 10 per cent are first-time buyers. Figure 5 also shows that, at end-2010,
there will also be a substantial number of borrowers who are “near” negative
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house. The numbers in negative equity, combined with the estimated shortfall
suggest that the extent of the total shortfall could reach €7.4 billion by the end
of 2010, suggesting that the average negative equity is approximately €38,000.
Once again it is those who bought close to the peak in house prices and are
FTBs who have higher average negative equity. 
Figure 5: Negative Equity, “Near” Negative Equity and Degree of Shortfall, 
End-2010
The estimates above suggest that a significant proportion of households,
approximately 1 in 3, will be in negative equity by end-2010. Using the
forecasts from the ESRI’s Recovery Scenarios, (Bergin et al., 2009) the analysis
is extended to assess how long negative equity will remain an issue for some
households. The results indicate that those repeat buyers with a high loan to
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buyers in negative equity by the end of 2010 the situation is more serious.
First-time buyers with a high loan-to-value ratio will not move back into
positive equity until after 2020. These estimates are, of course, dependant on
the assumptions made. A more rapid recovery in the housing market, leading
to stronger than anticipated house price growth, would see the problem of
negative equity resolved sooner. 
V  SENSITIVITY OF THE ESTIMATES
While Table 3 shows estimates for the number of borrowers in negative
equity it should be remembered that the estimates are sensitive to the
assumptions underlying them. In order to assess how sensitive the estimates
are, this section looks at the change in the numbers based on a series of
alternative assumptions.
The base estimates have been prepared assuming a mortgage term of 25
years for a repeat buyer and 35 years for a first-time buyer. Longer mortgage
terms, for example 35 years for FTBs, means that less of the principal is paid
off in the early years of the mortgage and so increases those exposed to
negative equity. If the estimates were produced using a mortgage term of 25
years for first-time buyers, then the numbers in negative equity would be over
7,600 lower at end-2009 and nearly 31,000 lower at end-2010. In the post-
boom period it could be argued that access to credit is more difficult and
mortgage terms may be curtailed. If it is, therefore, assumed that in 2009 and
2010 repeat buyers can only access a 20 year mortgage and first-time buyers
can only access a 25 year mortgage this has the impact of lowering the
numbers in negative equity at end-2010 by nearly 3,300. 
A similar argument may be made with regard to loan-to-value ratios over
the forecast period. If media reports are correct the maximum loan-to-value
ratio available at the moment is 92 per cent.10. Data on the range of LTVs prior
to 2004 is not available. A crude “weighted” LTV for the published data gives
an LTV of approximately 80 per cent for repeat buyers and close to 90 per cent
for first-time buyers. In order to assess the effect of lower LTVs the range of
LTVs is adjusted to lower the weighted LTV to 75 per cent for repeat buyers
and 85 per cent for FTBs. In effect mortgages with an LTV greater than 96 per
cent are eliminated for FTBs. The impact is to lower the numbers in negative
equity at end-2010 by 6,500. 
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term play an important role in determining if the borrower experiences
negative equity when house prices start to fall. As outlined above mortgage
product development became a feature of the booming housing market with
the introduction of 100 per cent loan-to-value ratios, interest-only mortgages,
subprime mortgages, and longer mortgage terms. In an attempt to assess the
impact of the changes to mortgage market products we, as an alternative,
estimate the numbers in negative equity holding the mortgage term and the
distribution of LTVs constant at year 2000 levels. Thus, the maximum mort  -
gage term is assumed to be 25 years for a first-time buyer and 20 years for a
repeat buyer. The distribution of LTVs within the categories published by the
Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government is estimated
from unpublished permanent tsb data. The majority of repeat buyers had a
LTV less than 70 per cent, while the most popular categories for FTBs, 37 per
cent of first-time buyers, was an LTV of less than 70 per cent and 30 per cent
with an LTV of 90-96 per cent. If the numbers in negative equity are estimated
using these assumptions the difference is striking. The number in negative
equity at the end of 2008 falls to around 23,000, at the end of 2009 the number
falls to around 57,000 and at end-2010 the estimate falls to 80,000. 
This counterfactual does not take any account of the fact that tighter
credit conditions would have resulted in lower mortgage volumes and may
have reduced house price inflation.11 However, the results point to the fact
that the easing of mortgage market credit encouraging home ownership has
contributed substantially to the estimated numbers in negative equity. This is
not unique to Ireland. Ellis (2008b) in an analysis of mortgage contracts and
negative equity finds that US mortgage characteristics, (high LTVs, interest
only, negative amortisation) help explain why US households have fallen into
negative equity in greater numbers than in the past. 
The estimates have been prepared using the permanent tsb/ESRI House
Price Index and house price forecasts from the Quarterly Economic
Commentary. However, there has been much coverage of anecdotal evidence
which suggests that the fall in house prices has been much greater than
captured by official statistics. Thus the sensitivity of the estimates to greater
house price falls is examined. As an alternative, house prices are assumed to
fall by 20 per cent in 2009 and by around 27 per cent in 2010. This would leave
house prices 50 per cent lower than their peak in 2006.12 This more severe
house price fall has a dramatic effect on the estimates of those in negative
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in 2010. 
Table 4: Alternative Scenarios and Negative Equity Numbers
Base  FTB Mortgage  Lower  Lower LTVs House Prices
Case Term = 25 yrs Mortgage in 2009 and  Down by
Terms in 2010 50 per cent 
2009 and 2010 from Peak, 
End-2010
End-2007 19,525 17,578 19,525 19,525 19,525
End-2008 57,389 51,574 57,389 57,389 57,389
End-2009 116,083 108,410 116,083 116,083 188,551
End-2010 196,015 165,101 192,747 189,472 349,715
Figure 6: Fixed Vs Variable Interest Rate, Mortgage Loans Approved
Note: The figures on fixed interest rate mortgages relate to mortgages which provide
that the interest rate may not be changed, or may only be changed at intervals of not
less than one year. 
The analysis is undertaken using the assumption of fixed interest rates
over the mortgage term.  Statistics from the Annual Housing Bulletin show
that in 2000 there was a large shift towards variable rate mortgages,
presumably the impact of joining the Euro and since then variable rate
mortgages account for the bulk of mortgage loans approved.  Use of a variable
interest rate would, in the current environment of low interest rates, lower the
mortgage repayments. In the early years of a mortgage the bulk of repayment
goes towards paying of interest rather than repaying capital. Thus, use of a
variable rate increases the numbers in negative equity. If the analysis were
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being fixed for the mortgage term then this has the effect of increasing the
numbers in negative equity at the end of 2009 by over 21,000 and at the end
of 2010 by close to 8,000. 
VI  WHO IS VULNERABLE?
The analysis in Section IV shows that mortgage borrowers in negative
equity are likely to be first-time buyers, and/or those with a high loan-to-
value. A general conclusion running through much of the research on negative
equity, (for example, Haughwort and Okah, 2009; Haughwort, Peach and
Tracy, 2008; Foote, Gerardi and Willen, 2008) is that the presence of negative
equity does not necessarily result in mortgage default, although it increases
the likelihood of default. Many households in negative equity will continue to
be able to make monthly mortgage repayments and so will not default. Those
who are at most risk of default are those who are in negative equity and who
experience a cash-flow problem. These cash-flow problems could be caused by
illness, divorce or job loss. Thus, the number of households that default
depends not only on negative equity but also on the conditions prevailing in
the macro-economy. 
The Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC) carried out by the
CSO asks households about the nature of occupancy. Microdata files from this
survey allow us to examine the nature of occupancy by sector of employment.
Figure 7 shows the distribution of households with a mortgage by the sector of
employment of the survey reference person for 2007. Over 20 per cent of
mortgages are held by those employed in financial services and nearly 15 per
cent by those in other production industries. 
QNHS microdata allow us to compare the distribution of employment to
the distribution of mortgages. While financial and business services account
for 12.5 per cent of employment it accounts for 21.1 per cent of mortgage
holders. Similarly, public administration and defence, education, and health
and social work each account for between 4-5 per cent of employment, but
account for between 10-12.5 per cent of mortgages. In contrast, in the second
quarter of 2007, just following the peak in house prices, construction
accounted for nearly 20 per cent of employment but only 6.7 per cent of
mortgages. 
The QNHS shows the deterioration in the Irish labour market in recent
times. There has been a large increase in unemployment, rising from below 
5 per cent prior to the first quarter of 2008 to a rate of 10.2 per cent in Quarter
1, 2009. Table 5 shows the change in employment by sector between the first
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Figure 7: Proportion of Households Who Own their Homes with a Mortgage by
Sector of Employment of the Head of Household* 
Note: *Where the PES of the head of household is ‘at work’. Reference period is January
2006 to December 2007.
**Sample size too small.
Source: Estimate based on information from the Survey on Income and Living
Conditions, CSO.
Figure 8: Proportion of Households by Sector of Employment of the Head of
Household* 
Note: *Where the PES of the head of household is “at work”. Reference period is
Quarter 2, 2007.
Source: Estimates based on QNHS data.
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first quarter 2009. The largest falls in employment have been in construction
(–31.3 per cent), other production industries (–11.4 per cent) and hotels and
restaurants (–11.1 per cent). Those employed in these sectors are more
vulnerable to the combination of negative equity and an income shock caused
by job loss.
Table 5: Employment by Sector, Annual Percentage Change
Q1 2008 Q1 2009 Q1 2007  Mortgages  Sector  
to Q1 2009 by Sector of  of
Employment Employment
Percentage Percentage
of Household  of Household
% % % Heads Heads
Agriculture, forestry 
and fishing 8.9 –13.1 –5.4 —* 8.1
Other production 
industries –4.5 –7.3 –11.4 13.9 16.5
Construction –5.9 –27.1 –31.3 6.7 19.9
Wholesale and 
retail trade 7.2 –9.7 –3.2 9.5 11.6
Hotels and 
restaurants –1.0 –10.2 –11.1 4.1 4.4
Transport, storage 
and communication –1.1 0.9 –0.2 5.3 6.8
Financial and other 
business services 8.2 –5.6 2.1 21.1 12.6
Public administration 
and defence 1.6 3.6 5.2 12.5 4.3
Education –2.1 6.1 3.9 10.7 4.5
Health and social 
work 5.0 1.4 6.5 11.4 5.6
Other services 4.0 –4.1 –0.3 4.2 5.3
1.7 –7.5 –5.9 100.0
* Sample size too small.
Source: Based on QNHS data and EU-SILC data.
It may well be the case that Ireland does not experience defaults to the
same extent as other economies. Unlike the situation for most of US
borrowers, mortgage borrowers in most of Europe remain liable for the
difference between the house value and the outstanding loan amount.
Furthermore, Table 5 shows that many of those who have mortgages are
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However, continued increases in unemployment spreading across more sectors
would put pressure on the default rate. 
VII  PUBLIC POLICY AND NEGATIVE EQUITY
Generally, policies put in place by government or by lenders do not directly
deal with negative equity but have had the goal of reducing the probability of
default. These are usually either loan modification which puts in place a
permanent change to the terms of the loan, possibly a lower interest rate or a
reduction to the outstanding balance. Alternatively, the lender may agree to
lower payments without changing the loan terms and the reduction in
payments is added to the outstanding balance, forbearance policies. In the face
of concerns about the rising number of households in negative equity the US
government has launched the Making Home Affordable Program13 for
borrowers through the Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae agencies. The Making
Home Affordable Program offers two different potential solutions for
borrowers: (1) refinancing mortgage loans, through the Home Affordable
Refinance Program (HARP), and (2) modifying mortgage loans, through the
Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP).
Closer to home, during the trough of the UK housing market in early 1993,
published estimates of households in negative equity were upwards of 1.5
million.14 The more recent slump in UK house prices has resulted in an
estimated 900,000 in negative equity (Tatch, 2009). Budget 2009 (HM
Treasury) announced the extension of a number of supports to those
experiencing negative equity. These include the Mortgage Rescue Scheme and
Mortgage Support Scheme for those who are vulnerable to financial difficulties
or who have suffered income or employment loss. The Mortgage Rescue
Scheme has two strands – an equity loan enabling mortgage repayments to be
reduced, or alternatively the debt is cleared completely and the applicant pays
rent at a level they can afford. The Mortgage Support Scheme defers some of
borrowers’ interest payments for up to two years, with the UK government
guaranteeing a proportion of the deferred interest. 
There has also been a private sector response to the difficulties negative
equity creates for housing market mobility. The Nationwide Building Society
in the UK launched a 125 per cent mortgage for existing customers who are
experiencing negative equity and need to move house. Borrowers needing to
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of the value of the property. An additional loan of 25 per cent of the loss
incurred from the existing property could be added on.15
In an Irish context, the Mortgage Interest Supplement scheme provides
short-term support to help pay mortgage interest repayments. If eligible,
assistance is provided with the interest portion of the mortgage repayments.
There are currently over 14,100 people in receipt of mortgage interest
supplement, an increase of 75 per cent, or 6,000, over the number in payment
at the end of 2008.16 A new statutory Code of Conduct on Mortgage Arrears
(Financial Regulator, February 2009), sets out some procedures for handling
mortgage arrears such as deferral of payments, extending the mortgage term,
changing the mortgage type, or capitalising the arrears and interest. 
Foote, Gerardi, Goete and Willen (2009), using US data, model the
decision to default. They find households that suffer income disruption are
more likely to default and on this basis argue that policies may be effective in
preventing default if they offer temporary assistance to borrowers, such as a
two year payment sharing plan.17 This may be effective for those suffering a
temporary disruption in income. However, it is more difficult to assist
households suffering a permanent income shock. In this situation polices that
would allow the borrower to remain in their home by changing their tenure to
renting could be considered.
VIII CONCLUSIONS
This analysis estimates the number of mortgage borrowers in negative
equity. A feature of the housing market boom was a large increase in the
numbers borrowing for house purchase. The length of the house-price boom
means that people who had entered the housing market in the late 1990s and
early years of this decade are, to date, unaffected. The decline experienced in
house prices to date, coupled with the anticipated decline in 2009 would
essentially capture people who financed purchases between 2004 and 2008
and would push 116,000 borrowers into negative equity. The anticipated
decline in prices in 2010 would take the number of borrowers up to 196,000
and include those who financed purchases in 2003 and 2009 with high LTVs.
Although this represents a large number of households in absolute terms it is
a small proportion of the stock of households in Ireland. 
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interest only mortgages and a longer mortgage term contributes to higher
numbers exposed to negative equity. This is in common with Ellis (2008b). The
analysis finds that those who borrowed at, or close to the peak, namely 2006
and 2007, with a high loan-to-value ratio are more likely to find themselves in
negative equity. FTBs are also more likely to have a mortgage the value of
which is higher than the house price. This in part reflects the use by FTBs of
longer mortgage terms. 
Negative equity can cause difficulties for households and for the macro-
economy. However, US research has shown that negative equity does not cause
default or foreclosure but rather is a condition of default. Foote et al. (2008)
find that less than 10 per cent of US households that fall into negative equity
default. It may well be the case that Ireland does not experience defaults to
the same extent as other economies. The research shows that many of those
who have mortgages are employed in sectors where employment prospects
remain relatively robust. 
International research has found that households that suffer the double
effect of negative equity and an income shock are more likely to default.
Policies that assist households overcome a loss in income may help lower the
default rate. 
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Worked Example of Negative Equity Calculation
First-Time Buyer
Drawdown 2004
House price,  €221,381
LTV 100%
Loan,  €221,381
Payment,          €11,006
Term (years)  35
Interest Rate  3.46%
Balance Interest Principal  Balance House Equity
paid (end  year) price 
(end year) 
€  €  €  €  €  €  
2004 221,381  7,660 3,347  218,034  221,381  3,347 
2005 218,034 7,544 3,462  214,572  249,499  34,927
2006 214,572 7,424 3,582  210,990  279,003  68,014
2007 210,990 7,300 3,706  207,283  260,786  53,502
2008 207,283 7,172 3,834  203,449  224,153  20,704
2009 203,449 7,039 3,967  199,482  195,013 –4,469
2010 199,482 6,902 4,104  195,378  169,661  –25,716
Note: House price is from permanent tsb/ESRI House Price Index, December each year.
Based on this estimation FTBs who drawdown their mortgage in 2004 with a
100 per cent LTV would be in negative equity by end-2009.
Based on DoEHLG data on loans and loan-to-value ratios this amounts to
2,014 FTBs.
(FTB loans in 2004 = 33,561, Proportion with 100 per cent LTV=6 per
cent).
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